A Bird’s Eye View of Internal Security Scenario
A nation’s march towards sustainable progress intrinsically depends on security ambience that increases comfort level of its citizens. Security is a multilayered concept. Besides capability to protect the country from external aggression and internal disturbances social, economic, environmental, class, gender etc securities define the contours and core of the security status of a nation. In fact, a people’s faith in the capability of the nation depends on multi-modular security its political geography and systemic tools offer them. Below a certain internationally accepted level, a nation is branded as a failed state or on the verge of failure.
Other broader classifications like under developed, developing and developed are assigned based on economic progress. However, for a nation to jump from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ category depends not merely on its economic indices, human assets, market values and level of industrialisation. Its sustainability as a developed nation depends on its internal and external security ambiences that are determined by numerous factors. Resurgence of the USA after Cambodia and Vietnam fiasco and collapse of the Soviet Empire after the Cold War are two glaring examples of a nations march towards sustainable progress and inevitable collapse.
India’s internal security parameters are normally measured through myopic police vision in terms of law and order and capability of temporary fire fighting. External security is a sophisticated process of clever mix of diplomacy, geostrategic situation, geopolitical considerations, global interactive prowess with concerned power groups and attainment of military capability in terms of proximate and projected enemies. The military science has inherited the legacy of the Empire and has added newer inputs from global positioning of power blocks, projected sphere of influence, land, maritime and air-space security and the country’s capability to maintain a sustainable level of limited war without disturbing the fundamental economic indices of the country.
Unfortunately, internal security in pre-independence India was measured in terms of the security of the Empire and not security of the people it ruled. The police and other tiers of bureaucracy were trained to offer and maintain security by the rules of the gun and strict implementation of the legal provisions. Often unorthodox methodologies were adopted to tame the thuggies, organised bandits and swadesists. The district administration and policing revolved around guarding the power-base of the rulers. Overwhelming numbers of Indians helped a handful of British to rule India for the whites. Right from the days of early Muslim conquerors to the British rule, the Indian elite formed the backbone of the revenue, judicial and criminal administration. They were not vexed by the peculiar security problems arising out of parochial, ethnic and religious incongruities and foreign intervention in the internal fault lines of India.
Barring ethnic and class struggles like the Santhal revolts, Faraizi movements and later day Tebhaga Andolan, which were primarily agrarian movements the security regulating and policy framing authorities did not have to face much disturbances on the internal security front. The iron grip of the Empire papered over most of the fault lines, which started springing up soon after the British escaped in a hurry and the political authorities in India grabbed greedily what they claimed to be the fruits of their struggle. Scores of unresolved inconsistencies, incongruities and imbalances were temporarily hidden behind the euphoria of independence and the trauma of a forced partition.
India’s internal security woes started from the day the British heaved up their anchor and sailed for their shores and the Indian ruling class deceived themselves and the people by imagining that the elixir of Independence was the only magic potion that could solve all the problems. They refused to see, perceive and plan for the fault lines that were papered over by the British and covered up by a subjugated administration fit to serve an empire and not the people of a sovereign democratic republic. India’s political class gained independence and the systemic machines left by the British continued to rule the people they way they were trained to rule by the white masters. Incompatibility between a sovereign democratic republic and an ancient imperial governing machine soon exposed the inability of the State to cope with the myriads of unsolved problems gifted by the British administration.
India’s Internal Security concerns cannot be delinked from its external geopolitical and geostrategic relationship with near and distant neighbours. Foreign powers exploited the internal fault lines with a view to bleed India wherever possible. India is beset with several types of Internal Security Fault lines. Of the numerous fault lines, the following need brief mention:
• Inherited from the unfinished political and administrative agenda of the British Empire
• Neglect and exploitation of the remote north eastern states followed by progressive
dismemberment of Assam.
• Inability of the Indian State to address the unresolved linguistic and ethnic-geography of India,
in spite of linguistic Reorganisation of States (1956).
• Inability of the Union and the States to economically develop various areas of the country on
equitable basis.
• Failure and connivance of the ruling party in Assam to check illegal Pakistani/Bangladeshi Muslim
migration to Assam, W. Bengal and other States.
• Inability of the Union to suitably address the flood of refugees from East Bengal/Pakistan
imposing serious economic strain on W. Bengal and inundation of the tribal population in Tripura.
• Political and administrative shenanigan that degenerated into fundamentalist movements and
insurgency
• Failure to bridge the gap between urban and rural economy. Inability of the Union and the
State governments to sever ties with the feudal system and carry out land reforms, reforms in
rural economic bases.
• Failure to socially and legally implement the Acts abolishing untouchability, reform the Caste
system and political exploitation of the Dalit and other backward communities-resultant social
stratification and tension.
Of the inherited problems, the immediate flashpoints confronted India first was the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. The British refused to resolve the problem before they escaped; the king vacillated irresponsibly, Jinnah had a blueprint ready to annex the territory and India fumbled under Mountbatten’s pressure until the Pakistani raiders attacked the state. In shameless violation of international protocols Pakistan, with helps from British officials annexed the Northern Territory, Gilgit and Baltistan and managed to curb out what is known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
Realisation that it could not annex the remaining part of Kashmir through conventional warfare Pakistan introduced proxy war through own intelligence agencies, Indian collaborators and jihadi tanzeems. Insurgency and organised terrorism based on Islamist programme have created an instable situation in J & K, which is now spilling over to the heartland India. Pakistan’s Kashmir jihad has now been buttressed by the emerging Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The gradual take over of the jihad by International Jihad Council is palpably visible. India’s Kashmir policy is a queer combination of a façade of elected democracy interspersed with central rule, administrative inability to carry out infrastructure development, combat religious radicalism and continued dependence on Army and Paramilitary forces to contain level of violence. India’s inability to solve the problem militarily, international diplomatic ambivalence and blatant Chinese support have complicated the insurgency situation.
Neither India nor Pakistan is likely to develop amnesia about the unresolved Kashmir problem. They would not allow international arbitration and India would be compelled to follow the status quo. For Pakistan, it is a low cost proxy war. It hardly matters if the jihadis die in the killing field of Kashmir, Waziristan and Balochistan. Pakistan outpaces the world Islamic powers in producing jihadis. The gangrene in Kashmir is sure to spread in other parts of India and spread the grand plan of Pakistani Deobandi, Tablighi Jammat, and other Islamist tanzeems to reoccupy India for Islam like the horse-back warriors did centuries ago. India is likely to bleed in Kashmir for an indefinite period.
The other geopolitical gangrene that India inherited was the Naga Territory, which was first infiltrated by the British in 1826. They gradually established posts and economic interests in the forest rich territory, which was fit for tea industry and nascent petroleum industry in adjoining Assam. Nominally, under the administrative jurisdiction of the Governor of Assam, the Naga Territory was left to direct British administrative care and proselytising activities.
Around 1945, when the British realised that it would have to leave India to its own fate, some British officers and a few strategists in Home Office, London prepared a blueprint to create a separate political entity in the northeast of India with a sea-opening through Chittagong. Jinnah’s claim of a greater Bengal with major parts of Assam (Brihot Bangla) gained credence when Nehru and Patel agreed on principle, on condition that, after ten years, Assam should decide if it wanted to be a part of Pakistan or India. Assamese nationalists and Subhasist and Hindu Mahasabha protagonists frustrated the conspiracy by persuading Gandhi to intercede with Nehru.
This offered an alternative idea to the British. They helped A. Z. Phizo and other Naga leaders to converge their tribal bodies to a broader Naga Nationalist Council in 1946. Followed by this the Governor of Assam Sir Akbar Hyderi reached a 9 point agreement with the Nagas. One of the clauses gave rights to the Nagas to reconsider their political status after 10 years. The agreement drawn under British aegis had sowed the seeds of secessionism, which was voiced by A. Z. Phizo. He staged a sham plebiscite in 1951 and declared independence. He continued isolated attacks on ramshackle Assam police and by 1956; he was in close touch with the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau and Inter Services Intelligence operatives in Dhaka. He decided to wage a war against India with Pakistani help. Since his escape to Pakistan hidden in a coffin and final lodging in London the Naga insurgency continued to rampage the Naga Hills and Naga inhabited territories of Manipur. The story of Naga insurgency with support from Pakistan and China is a classic example of ethnic insurgency seeded and aided by foreign powers.
The Shillong Accord (1975) between India and the NNC/NFG was not acceptable to pro-China leaders like Th. Muivah and Issac Chisi Swu. They moved over to China for training, logistics support. Since than the Naga problem is waxing and waning between peace talks and scattered skirmishes. Muivah, a Tangkhul Naga was given a chance by India to emerge as a pan-Naga leader and partially internationalise the issue. The Naga imbroglio is a unique example where a group of armed ethnic tribals has forced the soft-state of India to coexist with the contradictory paradoxes of democracy, armed rebellion, presence of large army and paramilitary contingents and indefinite dithering on the core issues of national integrity and assimilation of small discontent groups with the mainstream.
Taking advantage of this ambivalent attitude the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (Khaplang) have consolidated their respective territorial spread and grip on the administrative machineries of the state government. The old issue of Nagalim, a greater Nagaland by merging the Naga inhabited territories in Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal and if feasible Myanmar has created a chimera, which cannot be implemented by any stretch of redrawal of the political geography of the entire north east. This demand is ticking away as a time fuse attached to a nuclear device. Any further softening of attitude by government of India on this Naga demand is likely to explode on the face of the entire nation triggering off the process of disintegration.
The Mizo rebellion that surfaced in 1965 was the final manifestation of criminal neglect of the Christian majority Lushai Hills by an insensitive Hindu dominated Assam government. The abysmal performance by Indian army against China in 1962 had emboldened the Naga rebels. The idea caught up with other ethnic groups in the north east. The Lushais also longed for a new political geography and sovereign status as a prime Christian territory in the northeast.
Assam’s inability to offer good governance in the Lushai, Khasi-Garo-Jaintia Hills, North Cachar Hiils and the areas dominated by the plains tribals had started generating fuming discontent. The Luhais initially tried the democratic approaches to bargain better deal with the Assam and central government. However, the ambience of Naga insurgency, Rohingya rebellion in adjacent Burmese territory, some prodding by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Church (Billy Graham) and Presbyterian Church motivated groups of educated Lushai youth headed by Pu. Laldenga to rebel against India. The bamboo flowering (mautam) disaster of 1959 and mismanagement by Assam and Delhi governments compelled the Lushai tribes to consider consolidation of their scattered groups in India, Chin Hills of Burma and emerge as an independent state with an opening to sea via Chittagong.
Laldenga and his followers visited Pakistan in 1963 and established contact with Military Intelligence and the ISI. With Pakistan’s hidden plan to mount a surprise attack on Kashmir in 1965, the intelligence agencies struck a deal with the rebels and started dumping arms on Indo-Pak border to be used by the Mizo rebels on signals received from Pakistan. Mizo rebellion, with assistance of Pakistan started in February 1965. Pakistan hoped to pin down India in the north east while its army recaptured the Indian held part of Kashmir. Later China stepped in with training and logistics support.
However, the Mizo rebellion lost steam after defeat of Pakistan in 1971. The tired group of rebels settled for a political agreement. Mizoram is the only success story in the entire northeast where people’s desire for peace and progress defeated the foreign machinations.
The common denomination of Indian identity was not enough to fuse together the diverse ethnic groups like the Nagas, Mizos and Ahoms, Bodo-Kachari-Mech etc tribes. If language and culture could be the basis of reorganisation of other Indian states, the same should have been gradually applied to the other ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups in the northeast. Similar stresses and strains developed in Khasi, Garo, Jaintia, Mikir, Cachari tribal areas of Assam bordering Pakistan. Imbalance in economic development, absence of communication system and primitive governance in the hill tribal areas encouraged Pakistan to entice some Khasi and Garo leaders, especially Wycliff and Prentice to play the Phizo and Landenga games for attaining independence. The allurement of another independent Christian majority state in the Indian northeast also encouraged the Presbyterian and Baptist Churches to provide sinews to the dissenting tribal groups. Influx of Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini fighters in Meghalaya territory added ideas to the nascent thought of taking up weapons for liberation. However, the lessons of battlefields in Nagaland and Lushai Hills prompted the government of India to negotiate with the tribal and Church leaders and grant statehood to territory, renamed Meghalaya. The experiment was seeded with complicated contradictions. The Khasis are the most advanced of all the tribal groups in Meghalaya. They are mostly Christians. The Jaintias, Marak, Mikirs and Garos are mostly Hindus and animists. Linguistically and culturally, they are vastly different from the Khasis. The initial honeymoon in the Meghalaya experiment may start bursting at the seams sooner than later, creating fresh waves of demand for newer political identities to different linguistic, cultural and religious groups. Such portends are already visible. Several separatist groups have resurfaced and they are engaged in low key terrorism with liberal helps from Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence agencies.
The infernal fire of secessionism, insurgency and terrorism continue to devastate the territory of Manipur. Abode of valley Hindu Meiteis, about ten Naga and equal number of assorted Kuki-Chin tribes, Manipur has been a boiling cauldron since its merger with India in 1949. Most of the royal family and nationalist Meiteis had opposed the “deceitful” merger.
Meitei Hindus woke up to the reality that once a self-sufficient kingdom Manipur was being administered by Delhi’s mandarins and a puppet assembly and treated as a third grade political entity. Culturally closer to mainland Hindus the Meitei expected a better deal when the government of India was forced to grant to the Nagas in 1962. The Naga people of Manipur aspired to be a part of Nagaland. The Kuki and assorted non-Naga tribes aspired to be closer to the Mizos, struggling for a separate political entity. The King at Imphal was the unifying factor and the tolerant Meitei society hardly alienated the hill tribals. Abrupt disappearance of the King and appearance of hoards of hungry and corrupt Indian officials, who lorded over ubiquitously like God the Lord had sent rude shock waves in the simplistic Meitei society.
Political and administrative mishandling, inability to suppress Naga and Mizo revolt and overt Chinese interference pushed up the accumulated frustration of the Meitei society. Some educated fringe, a few frustrated former royal family conspirators and huge unemployed youths saw the inherent merit in armed uprising. The government of India, they realised, succumbed easily to armed defiance than constitutional approach. They too looked towards Pakistan and China for support from a platform called United National Liberation Front (1967).
The Pakistani Establishment (the ISI) allured a group of Hindu Meitei youths for training in the Sylhet district of East Pakistan in late 1968. They were offered the alluring prospect of Pakistani intervention with Myanmar for return the Kobow valley to Manipur earlier ceded by India. The ISI had set up camps for the Meitei youths at several places in Sylhet, where there are sizeable Manipuri communities. They were accommodated by the ISI in Srimangal and Kulaura camps and were given training in small weapons, use of explosives and fabrication of improvised explosive devices. The boys were treated with moderation and one Captain Mainul of the ISI had paid the Meitei volunteers an amount of rupees three hundred thousand.
Z.Ramyo, a Tangkhul Naga rebel leader, and Thinosolie Angami, a self-styled Brigadier of the outlawed Naga army, cemented the deal between the Meiteis and the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Oinam Sudhir, Arambam Somorendra and N. Bisheshwar were in contact with the Pakistani operators. For them Jiribam, then an isolated pocket of Manipur bordering Cachar, acted as a launching pad.
However, after the liberation war of Bangladesh, about 75 Meitei youths fled from East Pakistan camps. The security forces intercepted most of them and documents recovered revealed tantalising evidence of ISI-RGM (Revolutionary Government of Manipur) collaboration. Between 1972 and 1975, the Meitei terrorist activities had come under some control. However, bad governance, lack of development activities and rampant corruption forced the Meitei youths to the extreme end of armed resistance. After imposition of military rule in Bangladesh, the links between the Meitei youths and the ISI were resumed. Post-1975 Bangladesh government had allowed the ISI to set up shop in Habiganj area of Sylhet for training the Meitei youths and supplying them with military hardware.
In later years, the Meitei youths organised under various banners had collaborated with the Chinese and Pakistani intelligence operators based in Tibet and Bangladesh respectively. The Meitei insurgents under the leadership of Bisheswar had taken the Nepal route to Tibet. They were ideologically oriented by the Chinese and taught the tactics of urban guerrilla warfare. The Meitei-China contact took place around the time Th. Muivah was goaded by the Chinese to form the NSCN (I). Fresh Chinese interference had brought closer the Naga and Meitei insurgents.
The Kachin Independent Army of Burma and the NSCN (Khaplang) also aided them. As late as in 1994, the PLA remnants repaired to Bangladesh and set up camp in Sylhet. There they formed a political front called the Revolutionary People’s Front with Irengbam Bhorot doubling as chairman and supreme commander of its armed wing.
To make the long story of Pakistani collaboration short, it is sufficient to state that a Meitei rebel gang of seven was intercepted as late as in 1998 while returning from Bangladesh after receiving training from the ISI operatives and their DGFI counterparts. According to intelligence sources these youths were trained alongside the rebel Tripura youths of National Liberation Force of Tripura (NLFT) in Sylhet area of Bangladesh.
The Meitei youths had turned to all possible sources to procure arms and expertise: Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Kachin rebels, NSCN (K) and NSCN (IM). According to some impeccable sources, two members of the UNLF had visited Islamabad from Bangkok in 2001 for seeking assistance to fight the Indian forces. They had moderate success, as post-2001 Pakistan was reluctant to expose its hands more brazenly.
Manipur continues to bleed. The demand of Greater Nagaland and government of India’s ambiguous policy drift has compounded the situation. The Joint Intelligence (M) and Joint Intelligence (X) units of the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan based in Bangladesh, and other bases in the Arakan Hills of Myanmar and Thailand continue to stoke the fires. Inspiration and support from Chinese sources are also palpable. Meitei youths converted to Maoist-Leninist ideology have emerged as the most hardcore insurgent groups, which are not yet ready for opening any political dialogue. They cannot be treated as lackadaisically as India treats its socio-political and economic gangrene called the Naxalite movement. Manipur requires as much attention as the troubled Kashmir. It has the potential to trigger beginning of the end of Indian sovereign presence in the northeast.
The tiny state of Tripura continues to be beset with serious tribal unrest and terrorism. The fault line in Tripura was created by the unimaginative partition of India. With a sprinkling of Bengali population, and vast majority of tribals, Tripura presented a collage of cultural assimilation under the Debbarman kings. The composition of Tripura’s tribal communities is complex. The 19 micro-tribal groups are scattered in hill districts. The Tripuris are of Bodo-Cachari stock. Most of these tribal groups followed the religion of their kings, Hinduism, and several Bengali cultural practices. Way back in 1901, they formed about 53% of the population of the kingdom.
Drastic change in population ratio after the partition and migration of large Hindu Bengali population from East Pakistan generated economic and political conflict. The traditional loyalty of the tribal population to the Crown was decimated by sudden imposition of democratic rule, in which the Bengali-speaking people took a major lead. In short, demographic imbalance coupled with economic exploitation, political deprivation and encouragement by a section of the Christian Church had inspired the Tripura tribals to follow the paths earlier adopted by the Mizos and Nagas. Once the fault line widened, Pakistan and Bangladesh did not waste time to exploit it.
The first sign of tribal insurgency manifested in the formation of Seng Krak (clenched fist) around 1947, and Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) in 1967-68. Thereafter several insurgent groups have been formed: Tripura National Volunteers (B. Hrangkhawl-TNV), All Tripura People’s Liberation Organisation, All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), etc. The last one is often described as the Christian Taliban force of Tripura, because of their dogged loyalty to the Baptist Mission and liberal support given by the Southern Baptist Church of the USA. The NLFT movement had cut the tribal lives of Tripura on religious lines. Support of the Church has split some Tripura insurgent groups on Hindu-Christian lines. Heavy religious colouring is discernible in Christian tribal opposition to Bengali dominated political and societal affairs of the state.
Since formation of these organisations, Tripura witnessed a vicious cycle of violence. Four important features of the Tripura tangle are support by Congress and CPM to certain tribal militant factions for vote-bank politics, open support of the Church, and support by Pakistan and Bangladesh;
Involvement of Pakistan had started with assistance rendered to the TNV and TUJS from bases in Dhaka, Sylhet, Brahmanbaria and Chittagong Hill Tracts, where the ISI and Pak MI had set up elaborate arrangements for the Mizo rebels. The ISI operatives often crossed over to Tripura and helped the tribal targets to form armed cells. They were taught guerrilla warfare, jungle ambush and other predatory activities. Between 1968 and 1970, five groups of Tripura rebel volunteers were trained in Sylhet and CHT camps along with the Naga and Mizo gangs to give them the geopolitical perspective of anti-India activities of the ethnic minorities. Despite intelligence input the ruling governments, both Congress and Communists, wooed some of the tribal groups out of political compulsion and overlooked the blatant Pakistani input. Years of neglect and indulgence had steeled the division between the tribal and Bengali segments of the population.
Over years, the Tripura rebel groups established linkages with the NSCN (IM), UNLF, PREPAK and other rebel groups of Manipur and the Bodo and Kamtapuri rebels. Taking queue from the ATTF and NLFT, several smaller groups of terrorists had sprouted intermittently. A large number of small groups of extremists having links with either NLFT or ATTF came into existence and perished.
It is noteworthy that besides the ISI and the DGFI certain Islamist groups affiliated to the Jamait-ul-Mujaheedin and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami render support to the Tripura militants. Bangladesh, in all practical purposes, has emerged as the reliable partner of Pakistan in matters of exporting proxy war. If reports of Al Qaeda al Sulbah presence in Bangladesh are correct, (as believed by US sources) it can be safely presumed that the pro-Pakistani and pro-jihad elements in the neighbouring country will emerge as bigger threats sooner than later.
The woes of bleeding northeast cannot be painted poignantly without examining what had prompted the “assimilated” Hindu Asomiya society to follow the neighbouring Nagas and Mizos. Pakistan’s intelligence community and foreign policy framers and executors have seldom overlooked any opportunity to detect and exploit the ethnic fault lines in Indian northeast. The protagonists of ‘One India One Nation’ concept did not realise that India was a conglomerate of sub-nationalities and could be bonded together as a wholesome Nation only through balanced socio-economic and political sharing and caring was not understood by the political and bureaucratic class, which still suffers from the hangover of the imperial system. Sub-nationalities merge in the mainstream of the nation if the latter can prove that it is worth living in a well-bonded geopolitical identity described as nation. Even after Bangladesh was born out of Pakistan, India failed to recognise some hard factors that determine the concept of nationhood.
With political awakening, economic advancement and opening up of opportunities convinced the people of Assam that they were subjected by India to severe economic imbalance, if not exploitation. Assam, they alleged was being used as a raw material supply base for industrial India. The index of economic development of Assam and growth of infrastructure was appallingly poor. Like the British imperialists, the post-independence government of India treated this resource rich tract only as a tea, oil and forest products harvesting region.
These perceptions gave rise to conflict of interests, which were merely stewed into the political broth of India by its policy makers. They mostly treated these conflicts of interest and perceptions as law and order problems. Soon, the acute political and economic imbalances gave birth to disillusionment and diffidence. These natural eruptions were influenced by the existing ambience of insurgency in the northeast and by the scheming forces of ISI and DGFI of Bangladesh. At certain level, other foreign powers and agencies also collaborated with the ISI.
Assam, the eastern sentinel of India suffered most from economic and developmental imbalance compared to the rest of mainland India. Its quintessential ethnic geography contained volcanic proportions of tectonic fissure and its multi-religious ambience often presented the illusion of a classical civilisational conflict zone. The government of India tried to juxtapose the ethnic geography and accompanying political, economic and social ambitions of the people of the region in a half-hearted manner—conferring statehood status on the Naga tract and Mizoram and same status to Manipur and creation of Arunachal had drastically changed the political geography of Assam. Between 1947 and 1970, the policy planners failed to notice brewing anger and offer a better economic to Assam to assuage their hurt political and economic status.
The governments in Delhi and Assam had criminally neglected the influx of Muslim population from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh. Demographic imbalance created by such unchecked influx over a period of 60 odd years (1920-80) had generated serious political, religious, linguistic and economic imbalances.
Three major religious groups—Asomiya and Bengali Hindu society, predominantly Christian population of Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and increasing Christian population in Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura had contributed to social tension, political fluidity and had added fuel to the ambience of insurgency. Burgeoning Muslim population in Brahmaputra and Barak Valley of Assam considerably added to further communal tensions and growth of Islamic fundamentalist and militant organisations, which drew inspiration from the Islamist forces of Pakistan and Bangladesh. To these diverse factors of destabilising features were added the unresolved issues of ethno-political ambitions of the leading tribes like the Bodos, Rabhas, Kacharis, Mechs, Karbis and Tripuris (conglomeration of several smaller tribes), etc.
Politicians in mainland India and Assam had also not taken note of separatist ideas circulating in Assam Valley, especially in Upper Assam in early fifties and sixties. The Motok population took pride in their Thai origin and championed the cause of Ahom Tai Mongolio Rajya Parishad, an organisation that pleaded for a separate Ahom dominated state. The Motok people did not want separation from India but better economic deal and due share of its natural resources like tea, timber, oil, coal and other minerals. The Motoks lived nearer to the Naga insurgents and they had access to the lawless territory of Myanmar. Delhi depended more on the leadership of the Brahmaputra and Barak Valleys and did not pay attention to the embroiled psyche of the Motok people, who have a long history of struggle against the Muslim and British occupations. This tiny seed of separatism in Upper Assam had immensely added to the latter separatist movement spearheaded by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).
Inadequate, hesitant and half-hearted attention by the governments in Delhi and the northeastern states to these widening fault lines offered opportunity to Pakistan, China and Bangladesh to interfere in the internal affairs of India through their intelligence agencies and military establishments.
Assam went through silent tectonic convulsions for a long time and mutely watched the reduced political and economic influence of the state. The simmering agitation by the Plains Tribals, the Bodo-Kacharis and Dimasa etc tribes had also alarmed the Assamese perception of their political and economic security.
Pakistan and Bangladesh were not initially interested in helping the anti-‘Bahiragato’ (foreigners) agitation by the All Assam Students Association (AASU) that had started agitating in 1979 on the issue of inclusion of alarmingly large number of ‘foreigners’ in the electoral rolls. This was a genuine concern. Over six decades Muslim settlers from East Pakistan and Bangladesh had infiltrated in Assam and had settled down on agricultural lands owned by the Assamese. The Muslim League and the British administration encouraged such migration and later the Congress connived to increase its vote bank. The sleeping giant of Assamese conscience had finally woken up when threatened with territorial decimation, political marginalisation and pathetic economic neglect of their ancient land.
The concept of ULFA as a tool of grievance redressing through violent agitation was born in the minds of a few Motok youths, a dispossessed community with inheritance of the Tai-Ahom rulers who had conquered Assam and integrated with the Indian culture. The organisation was formed in April 1979 at Sibsagar, a seat of the ancient Ahom kings. Only a couple of ‘boys’ including Rajiv Konwar alias Arobindo Rajkhowa, Golap Barua alias Arup Chetia, Samiran Gogoi alias Pradip Gogoi and Paresh Barua were involved in the formation of ULFA. They were inspired by several factors–ongoing agitations by the AASU and AAGP, existing insurgency in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur and Marxist-Leninist influence on some of the Motok leaders.
There were some allegations that Assam Congress leaders had prompted the AASU and ULFA leaders to start serious ‘anti-bahiragato’ agitation after Delhi had installed a Muslim woman leader as the chief minister of the state. Intransigence of important Muslim leaders of the Congress and mindless minority wooing added fuel to the fire. According to Assamese perception, the Congress leaders had made a mockery of the concept of secularism only for retaining political power with helps from Muslim voters. Involvement of internal political intricacies in the growth of separatism amongst the Asomiya Hindus cannot be ruled out.
The allegation that the Assam Gano Parishad (AGP) and All Assam Students Union (AASU) were identified with the ULFA is only partially correct. The ‘anti-bahiragato’ (foreigner) agitation of the AASU had awakened the Assamese middle class and the rural population. Their anti-Bengali parochial history was turned to anti-Muslim agitation and a growing assertiveness of the assorted tribal population. The ULFA exploited the failures of the AGP governments, AASU leaders and appealed for armed action.
Pakistan and Bangladesh were suspicious about the motives of the ULFA as their political goal, though the separatist movement had coincided with the political motives of the AGP and ASSU, which had occupied the political centre stage riding on the crest of basically anti-Muslim ‘anti-bahiragato’ movement. The ULFA protagonists, like the NSCN (IM), had solicited support from the ISI of Pakistan on their own volition. Munim Nobis, a top ULFA leader, had visited Karachi along with a Bangladeshi businessperson in 1988 with a view to establishing contact with the ISI. Around that time, the ISI and the Pakistani Establishment had gathered enough expertise in supporting and sustaining the Indian rebels in the North East and Punjab.
This initial foray flourished into a passionate affair between the ISI and DGFI and the ULFA separatists. Paresh Barua sent Nobis to Pakistan next year. This time he walked into a Karachi police station and demanded to be taken to an ISI official. The ULFA leadership—Paresh Barua, Arobindo Rajkhowa and Arup Chetia—had initial discussions with the Dhaka based station chief of the ISI, one Habib Rana, an undercover diplomat. Paresh Barua’s friends in the DGFI, of Bangladesh, facilitated this meeting. These negotiations continued for over one year. Around October 1990, the top ULFA leadership was flown to Pakistan. At Peshawar, they were exposed to the Hizb-e-Islami faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Pakistani instructors imparted them training for over a month. Another round of visit took place next year (Sept 1991) when Paresh Barua and Sunil Nath visited Islamabad from Dhaka. They were taken to Darra, Asia’s largest illegal arms market. Pakistan wanted the ULFA to conduct Afghanistan type guerrilla warfare in Assam, indulging in large-scale killing, sabotage and subversion and tying up operational arrangements with the Muslims, who were smarting under pressure of extradition to Bangladesh.
At least 250-300 ULFA cadres were trained at Rawalpindi and other locations in Pakistan. The training included courses in the use of rocket launchers, explosives and assault weapons. Paresh Barua has been regularly visiting Karachi since 1991. Barua is also reported to have met Osama bin Laden in 1996 during a visit to Peshawar. The ULFA leader was taken to a camp on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where he not only received assurance of military help in the form of arms and ammunition, but also assurances of co-operation and logistical support of all international organisations owing allegiance to bin Laden, including the International Jihad Council, the Tehrik-ul-Jihad, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), apart from the Al Qaeda al Sulbah.
In fact, after 1991 ULFA-ISI liaison became a routine affair. The Pakistani Establishment and the ISI were still suspicious about the Assamese attitude towards the illegal Muslim migrants, the ‘bahiragatos.’ However, after 1992 the ISI and Islamist Jihadists had taken up a parallel approach in developing militancy amongst the Assamese Muslims. In this game, the ISI was ably supported by the intelligence agencies of Bangladesh–the DGFI, NSI and BDR intelligence wing. The Muslim militant organisations in Assam, about a dozen in numbers, were floated at the instance of ISI and Bangladesh intelligence operatives. Details of the growth of Islamic militancy in Assam and their connectivity with ULFA will be discussed separately.
Instances of Chinese input in the ULFA imbroglio were suspected for a long time. Contact between the Chinese intelligence and ULFA was facilitated by the NSCN (K). Some consignments of weapons were also procured from Chinese sources through the KIA. Much of the weapons the NSCN initially procured from the former Khmer Rouge in Cambodia between 1988 and 1995 were believed to have been routed to the ULFA by the Chinese agencies. Use of the surrogate was designed to conceal the origin of the supply. Recent seizures of a huge quantity of weapons from the Meitei rebel groups by the Burmese army in November 2001 from around Tamu—nearly 1,600 pieces of automatic weapons— have prompted speculations about the supply from Chinese sources from January 1990 onwards.
As far as Bangladesh’s DGFI and National Security Internal (NSI) are concerned, the State and the Central governments were painfully aware of full backing received by the North East terror groups from pro-Pakistan elements in Bangladesh Establishment and Islamist tanzeems. These matters were brought to the notice of the Bangladesh authorities through agency level and diplomatic channels. Bangladesh has consistently denied the existence of any Indian insurgent group’s presence in their country.
The ULFA leaders sheltered in Bangladesh have also developed vast financial interests in that country. Huge amount of money, suspected to be over $ 50 million was invested by the ULFA in several business interests jointly with Bangladeshi business houses controlled by sympathetic politicians and military officers. Income from these investments is ploughed back to Assam insurgency and maintaining plush lifestyle of the leading figures. This compelling bondage of financial linkage also stands in the way of individual ULFA leaders reneging from their ISI/DGFI controllers. It is reported that money matters had also generated misunderstanding between Paresh Barua and Arobindo Rajkhowa. ULFA’s collaboration with the splinter terrorist groups in North Cachar Hills- DHD, Rabha and Tiwa etc disaffected groups systematic ethnic cleansing by killing the Hindi speaking people added strength to the separatist movements.
Though the Bodo imbroglio appear to have reached the end of the tunnel it cannot be certainly said that the NDFB is yet to reach a satisfactory arrangement with the government of India and Assam and the leaders of the Bodo Autonomous Council. The BODO problem instigated by the government of India to pressurize the Asomiya people and to divert AASU and AGP’s attention from the “bahiragato” issue was another classic example of India intentionally inflicting injuries on own people for myopic political interests. The roles played by the R&AW, SSB and the IB in fomenting Bodo trouble at the initial stages have been widely chronicled. Like most other self-inflicted wounds, India lost control of the gangrene and the Bodo situation was efficiently exploited by the Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence communities.
Before leaving the northeast to other theatres of serious internal security war zones a few words must be added to highlight the potential of the Kamtapuri Librtaion Force active in Cooch Bihar, Jalpaiguri and parts of adjoining areas of Assam. Prolonged economic neglect, lack of infrastructure facilities and economic depravation had propelled a group of Koch-Rajbongshi malcontent elements to raise the banner of revolt. The Kolkata babus refused to listen to the grievances of the people and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), an umbrella organisation of the Bengali speaking Koch-Rajbongshi tribes, unfurled the banner of revolution to protest against the decade’s old neglect by the Caste Hindu dominated governments of West Bengal. The KLO was later taken under the wings of the ULFA and the NDFB and were encouraged to set up camps inside Bangladesh in collaboration with DGFI and ISI operatives. The NDFB and the ULFA were tasked to assist, train and support the KLO rebels from West Bengal. It is interesting to note that the fledgling KLO had also established camps in Bhutan forests alongside the ULFA and the NDFB.
The Kamtapur Peoples Party and the KLO were encouraged by Pakistan and Bangladesh as the rebel elements virtually ganged up with the ULFA and the NDFB to ‘soften up’ Indian defences in the chicken neck area between West Bengal and Assam. However, in recent months pragmatic political approach has started taking elemental care of the mountain of grievances.
Of the State-manufactured internal security problems that still cause concern are the Gorkha Land and Punjab imbroglio. The Gorkha Land problem in Darjeeling, West Bengal was a nascent low-key movement on cultural and linguistic fronts. The fiery Gorkha leader Subhash Ghising was selected as the new avtar of Gorkha emancipation by the Congress government of Rajiv Gandhi to open up a new political front against the CPM. The roles played by the IB, R&AW and a journalist who was later elected to Lok Sabha in fomenting the Gorkha unrest has been well chronicled. The potential of Gorkha Hill Council movement snowballing into a movement for Nepali consolidation is very much on the menu of strategic enemies of India.
However, the Punjab imbroglio that degenerated into a devastating insurgency trace its roots in early clashes between Arya Samaj, Shiromani Akali Dal and the SGPC on the one hand and Hindi-Punjabi language and script tussle on the other, was aggravated by denial of the Linguistic Reorganisation of States to the Akali dominated Sikh political formations. Besides prolonged agitation by Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh another movement carried out by Baba Kahan Singh, Sardar Kapur Singh ICS, and Narendra Singh Bhullar preached the theory ‘hum Hindu nahin hain’ and a separate homeland for the Sikhs. These strains of movements finally resulted in political skullduggery between Congress and Akali Dal. The Akalis confronted the government with Anandpur Sahib Resolutions, which demanded almost sovereign power for Punjab. Congress retaliated by fanning stronger fundamentalism by picking up a rabblerousing preacher from Damdami Taksal, Jarnail Singh Bhidranewale. The political honeymoon between Sanjay Gandhi-Zail Singh duo and Jrnail Singh soon degenerated into terror campaign against the Hindus and ended up in the demand for Khalistan, a separate homeland for the Sikhs.
Pakistan, with helps from a section of Sikh Diasporas and separatist elements in the SGPC fanned the fire and soon after attack on the Golden Temple and assassination of Bhindranwale took direct charge of the nascent terror movement and converted it to a fully-fledged insurgency. The Saga of Indian tragedies in Punjab, use of the State tools against own people and blatant Pakistani involvement underlined the futility of mindless political manipulation with the ambitions, aspirations expectations and sentiments of the people. The complicated sordid politician-made tragedy cannot be described in a few sentences. Being a part of the government machineries that cooked the tragic broth I have only to comment that this suicidal tendency of our political class is again threatening to push Punjab to the brink of fundamentalist separatism.
The Left-extremist movement in India better known as Naxal movement did not start with Naxalbari, a sleepy tea-town in Darjeeling. Basically an agrarian movement, the genesis can be traced back to Santhal-Munda-Ho rebellion against the Zamindars, Mahajans and the British. The Faraizi movement and Titumir’s rebellion, though linked to Wahhabi movement were movements of the deprived rural agriculturalists.
Struggles of the deprived cultivators, systematic destruction of home-based industry and increased stranglehold of the feudal system in pre and post independent India had various manifestations. Exploitation of the movement by the Communist party of India in Telengana, Andhra Pradesh had started with resistance against the Mulki rule of the Nizam. Beginning with the Andhra Mahasabha to armed resistance against the forces and Razakars of the Nizam and later against the forces of government of India had formed the bedrock of agrarian movement in India. Popularly known as Telengana movement the spirit had resurfaced in Bengal in the form of Tebhaga Movement. Initiated by Mani Singh, a veteran Communist leader in his hometown Netrakona, in Mymensigh, Tebhaga movement was organised mainly by the communist cadres of the Bengal Provincial Krishak Sabha. Besides Mani Singh, the name of Ila Mitra still evokes awe in the minds of many revolutionaries. Under their leadership, the barga (sharecropping) peasants got themselves mobilised against the landlords.
Tebhaga movement had hit nineteen districts of Bengal and most intensely felt in the districts of Dinajpur, Rangpur, Jalpaiguri, Khulna, Mymensingh, Jessore and the 24-Parganas. Zamindari repression did not abate the struggle. The resisting tenants rather added a new slogan to their agenda, the total abolition of zamindari system. The slogan for reduction of rent rate was also raised by the peasants supporting the Tebhaga struggle. Until partition of the country, the united Communist Party carried out heroic struggle and established Tebhaga areas in Jessore, Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri and Midnapur and 24-Parganas.
The threads of agrarian revolution and resistance by the deprived rural people resurfaced after split in the Communist movement under Charu Mazumdar, a fiery revolutionary who believed in spontaneous revolution and armed struggle. As a witness to the growth and manifestation of the movement in Naxalbari (1965-67), the author can assert that Charu and his followers were not vain revolutionaries. They believed in a genuine cause and the same causes continue to plague the rural areas and forest tracts of vast areas in India, despite proclaimed land reforms and economic regeneration.
The original Naxal movement was fated to be defeated but the sparks have spread over different parts of the country spearheaded by People’s War, MCC and CP (ML) etc organisations. The Indian Maoist movement, better known as Naxal movement is the potential political movement of India that might threaten the present political parties and caste and religion based political entities. The governments treat this as a law and order problem and refuse to recognise that after sixty years of independence it has become imperative to reexamine the land policy, rural development issues and building bridges between affluent urban and marginalized rural India.
Besides Nepal where Maoist revolution had spectacular growth the Janajuddha, Purva Banglar Communist Party and Sarvahara Party are carrying on the struggle started by Mani Singh, Ila Mitra and followers of Charu Mazumdar.
The Internal Security prognosis for India is mired with open and hidden fault lines. The most threatening development is related to rapid spread of Islamic jihad from Pakistan, Bangladesh and forces represented by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since Islamic jihad has emerged as a global phenomenon India with a vast Muslim population cannot remain insulated. Since gradual spread of jihad philosophy amongst the ulema, ignorant Muslim folks and educated and indoctrinated youth has stated taking concrete shape India has to sharpen up its forward and rearguard actions through diplomacy, strategic global connectivity and pragmatic internal security policies. The emerging canvas is too vast and complicated and cannot be treated in a few paragraphs. In the event of Pakistan and Bangladesh lapsing into the hands of the jihadists, India has to prepare for another prolonged struggle to defeat the forces, which had forced partition of the country in 1947.
