Pakistan’s Intelligence: Present & Future

Posted on | April 25, 2008 | No Comments

Some sensible and humourous Pakistani friends say: every country has an army; in Pakistan, the Army has a country. In most countries, the people own everything; in Pakistan, everything is owned by the Army.

This comment does not require elaboration as history of Pakistan proves beyond doubt that the Armed Forces and their ancillary tentacles have permanently hijacked the country. Along with the country, the Army has hijacked every tool of governance, including its intelligence agencies. The civil society’s malarial shivers for democracy are graciously allowed to wear a quilt of popular mandate either under extreme local exigencies or under foreign pressure. Democracy was somewhat restored after Pakistan suffered reverses in East Pakistan in 1971. Other interludes apart, this time around, the United States has forced the military ruler to try a mix of democratic and military weapons against the Taliban, Al Qaeda and several home grown jihadi tanzeems. Pakistan Army and intelligence apparatus either have failed or have lost the appetite to fight the Islamist forces. The fearful civilians shiver precariously between a blundering Army and the advancing jihadists.

Democracy is treated as external facades of the Pakistani polity. The kernel of power is hidden in the Armed Forces and the Intelligence Services of Pakistan. These two complimentary pillars of anti-people establishment of Pakistan are buttressed by the huge array of retired officers of the Armed Forces occupying innumerable (over 500) administrative, managerial and diplomatic posts. The professional civil servants and puppet political leaders belong to the lowest rung of the establishment machineries that run the country. They exist because they are yet to be extinct.

The latest farce of return of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, initiation of election process and some dusting off the parka of democracy were the resultant factors of US, UK and EU pressures. Pervez Musharraf had buckled down under external pressure as his own position in the army had become shaky and stirrings in the civil society headed by the legal practitioners and senior judges of the Supreme Court. Coupled with civil stirrings the Pakistani wing of the Taliban, al Qaeda and other jihadi tanzeems controlled and guided by the Inter Services Intelligence had broken out of the stable of Pakistan’s intelligence community and nearly established liberated territories in Waziristan, Swat and other areas in the NWFP. Pakistan rules these areas nominally purely through military actions. The Armed Forces have again emerged as the lone spine of Pakistan, though a tottering spine. Several layers of the Armed Forces and the intelligence community have also been infiltrated by the Jihadi forces.

The Armed Forces have adopted a creed that it is the permanent political spine of Pakistan and its intelligence services; especially the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is the important stabilising radar. Though an integral part of the Army Establishment, the ISI, managed by the Ministry of Defence, is not the only intelligence agency of Pakistan.

The major Intelligence security agencies of Pakistan are:

Federal Intelligence Agencies:
I. Intelligence Bureau
ii. Ehtasab (National Accountability) Bureau
Ministry of Defence:
i. Inter Services Intelligence
ii. Inter Services Public Relations
Army:
i. Military Intelligence
ii. Special Services Group
iii. Surveyor General of Pakistan (Geographical Division)
Ministry of Interior:
i. Federal Investigation Agency
ii. Narcotics Control Division.

It is not necessary to narrate details of Pakistan’s all these intelligence and security tools.
Besides the Intelligence Bureau, the Ehtasab Bureau (National Accountability Bureau), Federal
Investigation Agency and the Narcotic Control Division play important roles in domestic intelligence
and security administration.

The Intelligence Bureau headed by Brig (Retd) Ijaz Ahmad Shah, a confidant and former ISI handler
of Afghan Mujahideen and Osama bin Laden has earned enough notoriety in recent times. He was
named before and after arrival of Benazir Bhutto as one of the officials who opposed any concession
to the democratic forces. Such controversy around the IB is not new.

Pakistan Intelligence Bureau (PIB) is the inheritor of the Central Intelligence Bureau of British India. Its counterpart, the Intelligence Bureau of India, is the prime internal security and intelligence agency of the government of India. The Intelligence Bureau, one of the oldest security and intelligence edifices of the British Empire, had inherited the established skills and tools of the trade. Prior to 1958 military takeover, the PIB used to be answerable to the Cabinet Division of the Prime Minister’s secretariat. The PIB, like its Indian counterpart, covers activities of the political parties, activists and carries out internal security related functions, which encompass the entire panorama of the civil society and internal functioning of the Jihadi tanzeems. It is also responsible for counterintelligence operations on Pakistani soil.

The Intelligence Bureau had gained prominence under Benazir Bhutto’s last tenure. She used the agency and its controversial Director Masood Sharif to topple provincial governments and to carry out extensive surveillance on her political opponents and adversaries. Such blatant use of the IB to the consternation of the military and the ISI was cited as one of the reasons for Benazir’s dismissal in November 1996. However, under President Musharraf the IB attained greater prominence as ‘terrorist liaison’ and ‘trouble shooting’ operators.

Organisationally, Pakistan IB follows the old British pattern, which is also the beaten path for the Indian Intelligence Bureau. It has strong presence in the provinces with units located at tehsil (revenue unit) and sub divisional level. The IB has significant presence on the international borders with India and Afghanistan. It shares over 25 units with the ISI in Balochistan where a separatist battle is shaking Pakistan.

In certain sensitive operational areas like the Indian borders, NWFP, Northern Areas the ISI, Narcotics Bureau, MI Directorate and the Geographical Division also share joint responsibilities with the IB. In Gilgit and Baltistan areas, the IB shares its responsibility with the Special Services Group (SSG).
The present IB chief has had a colourful career in the army. As an experienced hand of the Afghanistan Bureau of the ISI, he handled Mullah Omar, the Taliban Chief and Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda supremo. His friendship with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is legendary. Even now, Hikmatyar’s camps in Peshawar are patronised by the IB. Brig. Ijaz had prominently figured in the internationally infamous Mukhtaran Mai case. He had tried to suppress the case under orders from boss Musharraf.

There are reliable information of his open connectivity with Mohammad Atta and Ahmed Omar Sheikh, related to 9/11 attack on the USA and Daniel Pearl murder. Musharraf had tried to accommodate his loyal soldier by offering him appointment as High Commissioner to Australia and Ambassador to Indonesia. Both the governments had spurned the posting on grounds of Brigadier Ejaz Ahmad Shah’s alleged connectivity with Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

The attack on Benazir Bhutto’s motorcade by two alleged al Qaeda suicide bombers has drawn instant criticism from the former PM of Pakistan and a section of the media. In spite of global understanding of Ejaz Shah’s connectivity with the terrorist outfits, he continues to enjoy the confidence of President Musharraf. With the prospect of Musharraf, being in charge the Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan is expected to play important roles in Pakistan’s internal political, security and jihadist activities.

Benazir Bhutto had written to Musharraf and her friends in the US about latent threats she faced from the present IB chief and other officials of the ISI. The circumstances of her assassination and post-assassination developments have given rise to speculations and reasonable doubts that the killers of Benazir had umbilical connectivity with the Pakistani intelligence community. Who killed Benazir? This question has not been solved and is not likely to be solved like the assassinations of Liaquat Ali Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistani governing tools are controlled by the army. Unless the army and its present controllers President Musharraf and General Kiyani give clearance, the truth would be lost in the maze of investigations.

The other important intelligence agency of Pakistan that has gained global eminence is the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The Inter Services Intelligence Directorate was conceived, back in 1948, apparently as a nucleus inter-services co-ordination module and a tool to generate external intelligence, by Major General R. Cawthorne, an Australia born British Army officer, who had opted for the Pakistan Army and served as the Deputy Chief of Staff.

Though the credit is given to Cawthorne, the inspiration had come from Britain. Pakistan army had inherited a Military Intelligence unit and did not require a special agency to coordinate different wings of the infant armed forces. Pakistan was also not positioned as a global player to take up a crash programme for creating an external intelligence agency like the MI6 and the CIA. At the initial stage of transfer of power, Britain needed the ISI as a companion agency to strengthen its own strategic perspectives in the region. They were keen to use this agency as a watchtower against Afghanistan, Russia and China. The British GHQ also wanted the ISI for keeping a watch on the new corps of Pakistani Army officers.

However, after hijacking the democratic dispensation Pakistan army did not strictly follow the British blueprint. Pakistan drifted closer to the USA, which had emerged as the greatest surviving power after the Second World War. With the initiation of the Cold War Pakistan was drawn to the US led coalition and security umbrellas floated by the anti-Soviet countries. The ISI, thereafter, leapfrogged to international area as a partner agency of the CIA and MI6. As a leading modern Muslim power, Pakistan also commanded respect of the Middle Eastern and African Muslim countries. These countries, generally aligned to the US block patronised the ISI and other military wings of Pakistan.
Besides fulfilling its commitments to the US headed global intelligence and security tasking the ISI was extensively used as back as in 1958-60 for two other important missions: interference in domestic politics and for fomenting ethnic unrest in Northeast India and Kashmir.

In internal political evolution since 1958, the ISI visibly aided the military rulers in destroying the democratic soul of the political movement once spearheaded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The agency had intruded into all aspects of civil administration and democratic bodies and gradually subjugated the civil society.

Externally the ISI emerged as the main ‘proxy war’ tool of Pakistan against India, which it fought through conventional intelligence operations, direct involvement, operations through jihadi tanzeems patronised by the State and through third country operations. The sordid story is an integral part of Indo-Pak relations spanning 50 years of Pakistani ‘proxy war’ against India that encompass Kashmir, Punjab, Northeast and susceptible hinterland targets.

It is necessary to understand the basic structure of the evil machine of Pakistan that had played decisive roles in collaboration with the Royal Saudi Intelligence, MI6 and the CIA in defeating the Cold War enemy of the West in the Soviet Vietnam of Afghanistan. It also played significant roles in the rise of the Taliban, al Qaeda and Islamist terrorism almost everywhere in the world. Footprints of the jihadist activities anywhere in the world finally lead to the soil of Pakistan. In recent times, the “blow back” factor has turned the jihadists against Pakistan and according to Western intelligence estimates; the ISI has started losing control on the jihadi tanzeems.

Following is the available list of illustrious heads of the ISI who had fashioned the political characters of the army, dominated its political spectrum and carried out open and secret wars against its historical enemy India and enemies of its Western allies.

1. Brig. Riazat Hussain : 1958 onwards.
2. Lt.Gen. Ghulam Jillani Khan : 1969 to early years of Zia-ul-Haq.
3. Lt.Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rahman : Zia regime till March 1987.
4. Lt.Gen. Hamid Gul : March ’87-May 1989.
5. Lt.Gen. (Retd) Shamsur Rahman Kallue : May ’89-Aug 1990.
6. Maj. General Assad Durrani : Aug ’90-March 1992.
7. Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir : March’92- May 1993.
8. Lt.Gen. Javed Ashraf Kazi : May’93-June 1994.
9. Lt.Gen. Nasim Raja : June’94-1996.
10. Lt.Gen. Ziauddin 1996 : sacked by Musharraf in 1999. His retirement benefits were
reportedly denied.
11. Lt.Gen. Mahmood Ahmad : Dismissed by Musharraf under American pressure for complicity
with the 9/11 conspirators. India, it is reported, had supplied supporting material to the
USA.
12. Lt. Gen Ehsan-ul-Haq : Posted on Oct 8, 2001. He was the Corps Commander at
Peshawar. He was formerly posted at Pakistan High Commission in Delhi in the rank of
Counsellor. Removed in October 2004.
13. Lt.Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani : Appointed on October 4, 2004, now Army Chief .
14. Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj : Appointed in September 20, 2007.

General Madame, a fierce Mascara loyalist, is a staunch Punjabi Jat from Jhelum area and is related to him through his wife. He had been his Military Secretary and was in the same flight from Colombo when PM Nanas Shari made efforts to disallow his Army Chief from returning to Pakistan in a brief aborted coup. Loyal Generals had dethroned Nanas in a counter coup paving the way for Mascara’s ascendance. General Nadeem enjoys complete trust of President Musharraf. It is expected that with the loyalist IB, ISI chiefs, and a friendly Army Chief Musharraf can survive the vicissitudes of the democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan and the renewed thrusts of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Musharraf is expected to be at the helm of affairs until the USA substitutes him by another General or the jihadis take control of the country.

Following is the broad divisions of the functional structure of the ISI:
1. Joint Counter-Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) —it is responsible for counterintelligence activities and operations;

2. Joint Intelligence Signal Bureau (JISB) — it generates and denies Signal intelligence and liaise with the Signal Corps of the Armed Forces and the US and UK signal intelligence community;

3. Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) —it handles political matters. One section is assigned to study and assess Indian political developments;

4. Joint Intelligence Finance (JIF) — it manages budgetary and non-budgetary funds of the ISI; evaluates and approves critical operations;

5. Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT) —it is responsible for technical, including ElInt, PhotoInt, ImageInt, SatInt, etc;

6. Joint Arms Direction Group (JADG)—this wing is responsible for planning coordination in military exercises and procurement of weapons from unconventional sources, besides periodical evaluation of joint exercises;

7. Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) —it oversees forward intelligence tasks, sabotage and subversion operations in foreign countries. Three sections are devoted to India;

8. Joint Intelligence North (JIN) —it is the hub of operations in Kashmir and other “special operations”;

9. Foreign Liaison Section (FLS) —responsible for liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services;

10. Inter Services Federal Intelligence (ISFI) —it supplements the intelligence efforts of the provincial governments and often works as the direct arm of the political/military bosses in internal political matters;

11. Public and Service Groups (P&SG) —it functions in close liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and maintains media liaison. The post-holder is generally close to the Chief of the Army Staff and the top executive. The position holder is handpicked;

12. Joint Intelligence X —its exact functional charter is not known. It is said that this wing is responsible for Intelligence Estimate, Threat Assessment and Formulation of Highly Sensitive Operations, including assassination, in collaboration with the JIB, JIM, JIN and ISFI.

Like most other intelligence organisations, the ISI has put in position a well-defined functional and operational structure as follows:

Director General Intelligence (DG ISI)
(Three star General)
|
Deputy Director General-Political
(Two star officer)
|
Deputy Director General-External I
(Two star officer)
|
Deputy Director General-External II
(Two star officer)

The number of two star officers has proliferated over years and it is estimated that four such officers of the rank of Major General (one each from the Air Force and Navy) have been put in charge of designated divisions. These are reported to be post-Nawaz Sharif developments.

The DDG (Pol) controls the territorial and subject desks and sections, which cover the activities of the political parties, student, labour, mujahideen organisations, madrassas and religious institutions, tribal affairs, internal surveillance/security duties, VIP security duties, minority affairs and anti-terrorism activities. An officer of the rank of Brigadier generally heads each sub-division. However, officers of the rank of Colonels and Majors head some of the lesser units.

The DDG-Pol continues to function with full blessings of the military dictator and is said to have been tasked to screen the election aspirants, candidates, eliminate the undesirable aspirants either by persuasion or by force and to ensure that the election returns a rubber stamp National Assembly.
The office of the DDG-External I requires some special mention. It controls the ‘foreign operations’ of the ISI and presides over the most dreaded wing of the ISI-Counter intelligence. It also covers the territorial, geo-political, economic, strategic intelligence affairs in the Middle East, Africa and other countries. The DDG-Ex I also maintains liaison with the PMO (whenever there is one), and with the office of the CMLA/CEO/President, whatever designation a military dictator prefers to decorate himself with. DDG-External I is a powerful position.

DDG-External II has the onerous responsibility for coordinating activities of Joint Intelligence M and N, which are India and Kashmir specific. It also supervises and coordinates activities of the Jihadi tanzeems, which do not cross the limit imposed by the Pakistani rulers and draw attention of the US agencies. The operations in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Gilgit and Northern Areas are also overlooked by this branch.

With the Al Qaeda and Taliban establishing firm foothold on the NWFP, South and North Waziristan and Chitral Tract, the ISI is called upon to generate intelligence and assist the Army, which is fighting a losing battle in the tribal areas. It has been alleged by US observers that considerable number of rogue and Islamicised ISI and Army personnel were encouraging the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces to establish stranglehold in the tribal and frontier areas. The ISI and the Army had brokered a temporary peace with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in South Waziristan in February 2007. However, this brief spell was disturbed after several tribal chieftains joined hands with the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Mullah Mehsud apart, the entire Waziri tract is now infested by Taliban and Al Qaeda warriors.

“In recent months, as Musharraf has grown more and more unpopular after eight years of rule, Islamists have been emboldened. The homegrown militants who have hidden Al Qaeda’s leaders since the end of 2001 are no longer restricted to untamed mountain villages along the border. These Islamist fighters now operate relatively freely in cities like Karachi—a process the U.S. and Pakistani governments call “Talibanization.” Hammered by suicide bombers and Iraq-style IEDs and reluctant to make war on its countrymen, Pakistan’s demoralized military seems incapable of stopping the jihadists even in the cities.” (Where The Jihad Lives Now-Ron Moreau and Michael Hirsh-News Week, Oct 19, 2007).

Under these circumstances Pakistani observers have commented that the al Qaeda and Taliban are happily cohabiting with homegrown jihadis in the interiors of Pakistan’s mainland and even in cities like Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. The ISI, IB and the Army are reluctant to confront them as the lessons of the Lal Masjid incident and loss of over 1500 soldiers in the tribal areas have scared them. Willy nilly the intelligence and security agencies and a section of the army are cooperating with the jihadists. With increasing pressure at home and from USA for restoration of democracy the ISI, IB and the Army might feel more comfortable with the Talibanised Pakistanis.

Dell Dailey, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief has, in a recent statement expressed concern over the ineffective coverage of Taliban al Qaeda and other jihadi tanzeem activities by the ISI. Some doubts have also been expressed that certain elements in the serving and retired ISI officials are playing double games either on their own or at the instigation of the rulers of Pakistan. They are hunting with the jackals and running with the hares.

With such internal portends the prospects of ababtement of Pakistan’s accelerated thrusts inside Indian mainland appear to be dim. Though it is claimed by sections of observers that the ISI has started losing control on the jiahdi tanzeems its India operations have so far not been impeded by the internal turmoils. The ISI in collboration with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh (DGFI) are already promoting jihadist activities in Bangladesh and exporting jihad to India through al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba. Jaish-e-Mohammad, Al Badr, HUJI and Jamait ul Mujahideen Bangladesh etc outfits. There are reports of infiltration of the Paksitani Sunni militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi into India. This group was responsible of serial terrorist strikes in NWFP, Punjab and Sindh. Reports of ISI links with this Punjab origin outfit should worry India as majority of the Indian Muslims also share the Deobandi and Hanafi tenets with their Pakistani counterpartrs.

These tanzeems are feranchised by the ISI to carry out blasts and mass killings in India. Pakistan and Bangladesh are merrily perching jihadi footprints in India by opening innumerable modules. Pakistan often argue that it has no control on these tanzeems and some of these have been banned. The banning drama is for US consumption. As far as India is concerned the ISI maintains steady working relationship with all these tanzeems. Besides its serving officers of the JIM and JIN some retired ISI officers are also commissioned to liaise with the tanzeems and to carry out terrorist task inside India.
On the other side of the spectrum, the ISI and the DGFI are jointly and sevearlly aiding and supporting the insurgent outfits and certain Muslim separatist organisations of Northeast India. It is estimated that with greater instability in Pakistan and Bangladesh the jihadist forces would succeed in establishing firmer foothold in India. The ISI and DGFI are not interested and motivated in checkmating jiahadist amibience in their own countries. They are being encouraged by Internationsl Islamist Jihad Movement to expand their activities into India, besides defeating the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere in the globe.

The often asked question about the future of Pakistan’s Intelligence agencies cannot be answered astrologically. Evolution and reconditioning of these tools of governance would depend on the immediate future political evolution of Pakistan and its geostrategical juxtapositioning alongside its allies like the USA, Saudi Arabia, UK etc.

Internally the Pakistani society is vertically and horizontally divided into three distinct camps: those who aspire and want to achieve true democracy; the fundamentalist and jihadist forces who want Taliban type regime in Pakistan and strong segnments of the Armed Forces which want continued military hegemony. With the return and assassination of Benazir Bhutto and likely emergence of Nawaz Sharif in the political centre stage, the democratic forces might coalesce around him and other PPP stalwarts and struggle for restoration of democracy. However, the visible differences between the Muslim League (N) and the PPP on the one hand and the coalescence of pro-Musharraf forces around Muslim League (Q) might throw Pakistan into another uncertain political tailspin. In the end the “soul of Pakistan”-the Army might continue to rule with support from puppet democratic forces. In that event, Pervez Musharraf might continue to garner patronage of the US in the name of fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda forces. That scenario might add tougher sheen and shine to the ISI and the IB.

The internal security scenario in Pakistan has become fragile. The Jamait Taliban-e-Pakistan headed by Baitullah Mehsud, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad and allied jihadi tanzeems have more or less taken control of major portions of the NWFP. The ISI, IB and MI operatives are being regularly targeted by the militants. Recently a deputy director of the IB was killed at Charsadda and several ISI operatives were assassinated in Swat and Waziri areas. It is evident that the IB and the ISI operatives are trying buy peace with the militants. That was the reason behind sudden emergence of the Lal Masjid as the focal centre of jihadi activities in the heart of Pakistani capital. Recent violent incidents in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad indicate that either the intelligence community in Pakistan have been outpaced by the jihadis or they are in hands and gloves.

On the other hand, the situation in Balochistan is causing concern. Despite huge military presence, the ISI and the IB are not able to cope with the violent surge of the Balochistan Liberation Army and Balochistan Liberation Front.

President Musharraf has been left with limited manoeuvring capability. Though surrounded by loyal Army Chief, Corps Commanders, ISI and IB chiefs, Mushrraf can count on the loyalty factor as long as the factor hangs on the strings of US support. In Pakistan, loyalty is as amorphous as fast evaporating camphor.

No one can rule out another Junta coterie deposing Musharraf and repacking Nawaz Sharif to another spell of exile. However, it appears that the tired, dispirited and exasperated Army is inclined to give a limited trial to the US arranged political marriage between democracy and military rule. The immediate-range future of Pakistan would depend on the success of this experiment. The civil society and the democratic forces have to walk carefully along a multi-edged sword; between the military, which is the traditional political soul of Pakistan, the Jihadist and Islamist forces trying to wrest the soul of Pakistan, and the civil society that is expecting too much from the political personalities.

In a scenario like this the ISI and the IB are likely to cut out fine furrows for their own existence, between the hazardous territories dominated by International Islamic Jihadists, the ambitious leaders of the Armed Forces and the burgeoning expectations of the civil society. These agencies would like to cater to all palates as far as practicable, thus preserving their own identity and interests and swinging along with the wind whichever is stronger. However, history is witness to subversion of the Pakistani system by the ISI and IB at the behest of the Army top brass. Designing of Pakistani democracy by the Army and ISI were witnessed in the past and the same scenario might be re-enacted.

Minute analysis of the historical threads of the soul of Pakistan Army and the country’s jihadist soul and weakened and stunted democratic forces it can be deduced that the Army would not agree to hand over power to the civil society and return to the barracks. The jihadist forces comprising the Taliban, al Qaeda and home grown tanzeems are not likely to vacate the safe bases in Pakistan. They are likely to strengthen these bases and widen their activities in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Central Asian countries, India and Bangladesh etc, besides other theatres in West-Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. Pakistan is expected to be the strongest base of the Islamic jihadist forces.

Therefore, it would be premature to assume that the Pakistani intelligence agencies would disarm themselves and willingly function as appendages to the civilian government. The ISI, MI and the IB are expected to support the jihadists and political hegemony of the Army. They would, in all certainty, continue to escalate jihadist activities inside India. The Indian tools of governance, both civilian and Army should, therefore, remain focussed to the internal developments in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan and tune their security antennae to fight these diabolical forces.