WHY DO WE FAIL?

Posted on | April 25, 2008 | No Comments

Serial bomb blasts (93) in Mumbai, attack on the Parliament, hijacking of IC 814 and the latest but not the last devastating serial bomb blasts on Mumbai suburban railway system generated media-fever, crocodile-tears from politicians, motivated leakages by police and intelligence agencies, communal cleavage and erosion of faith on the governing capability of the political system. The fever would subside; rhetorics would be morphed to ballot box paranoia, the police and intelligence agencies would lapse back to routine servitude and the people, and the nation would continue to live with deep scars anticipating footsteps of other disasters.

India’s war against internal disruptive forces, ethnic insurgencies, pseudo-religious sub-nationalist terrorism, the Kashmir gangrene and unresolved agrarian unrest and imbalance between urban and rural economy (brand named-Naxalism) have been weaved into the texture of daily routine. Deformity in criminal justice system does not pain us anymore. Restructuring of ethnic political geography and increasing assertion of regional (provincial) autonomy within the crashing debris of the Federated Unitary System are being absorbed at regular intervals. Even after 59 years of independence, the Republic is yet to be fully federated and a new India Inc is yet to emerge. India limps with pain and gasps with expectations. The people are learning to cope.

However, India has not been able to cope with the threat quanta from regional and global Islamist Jihadist forces. This multidimensional cancer travels through the arterial system of the country along the scarred tissues of fractures and carcinogenic gaps left by the philosophised neurosis of pre and post independence unassimilated edges of history. The Pakistani Establishment and the ISI have deftly exploited these gaps and unmatched edges in collaboration with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh and the Islamic tanzeems patronised by them.

Journeying through the Afghan killing fields, tangoing with the Taliban and Al Qaeda and resurgent global Islamist thrusts, Pakistan has emerged as the geopolitical epicentre of Islamist Jihad with a binary centre in Bangladesh. Extension of Pakistan’s proxy-war through jihadist tanzeem tools to all conceivable corner of India is a part of its strategic war plan—mostly carried out with subversive terrorist attacks and sometimes with Kargil type forward thrust. It is, nonetheless, part of a planned war. India’s internal security and the seams of national unity and solidarity have been repeatedly threatened by jihadist operations carried out by ISI and DGFI aided Pakistani and Bangladeshi tanzeems. This war, under the facet of peace, is about to invade every Indian home. In the scale of one to ten, the jihadi tanzeems and handful Indian collaborators score success in about eight and half cases. The Indian intelligence agencies and State police forces can claim success in about two and half or three cases. In the scale of law of average, this is classified as Failure.

Why do we fail in over 8.5 % of cases? We fail because:

1. With minor exceptions the political class, presumed custodian, driver and preserver of the Constitutional Democratic Republic fail to recognise that India exist beyond ballot boxes. On either side of the imaginary ‘secular fence’, there is abominable amnesia about the historical roots of the jihadist thrust against India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and other global jihadist tanzeems. Either they communalise or trivialise the grave threat to national security, unity and integrity by throwing mud on each other with squinted eyes on the bulge of the ballot box. The threat is not about ‘secularism’ or ‘Hindu Muslim divide’; this is all about an undeclared multidimensional war involving India (irrespective of community and religion), Pakistan and Bangladesh, over-lorded by International Islamic Jihadist Inc, represented by Al Qaeda al Sulbah and its global franchisees. Political parties on either side of the imaginary ‘secular fence’ (like Tropic of Cancer that divides India almost into two equal halves) should understand that even before partition of the subcontinent certain Islamist leaders had targeted the Indian Muslims for curving out a Muslim First Nation, which they called Pakistan. The descendants of same Halagu conquistadors are targeting to divide India on communal lines and the gullible vote-blinded politicians still cling to their ballot boxes and keep dividing the country from behind their respective Tropic of Cancer. They fail to recognise that the cancer is real and not an imaginary geographical line. When would the responsible media and people ask them: Damn idiots! It’s all about national security and not ballot boxes and ‘secular fencing’?

2. I do not think more space can be spared for the paranoid political classes. The ‘Permanent Government’ (bureaucracy-including intelligence, police and security) has always been the steady spine of Indian administrative system. These elements of governance should have succeeded in meeting the challenges coming from across the borders. Unfortunately, the ballot box baboons have either disarmed or de-fanged and emasculated these precious tools of governance.

3. We fail at two crucial combat levels. Most important combat force is the State Police and Intelligence Forces. Each district and Commissionary is equipped with a dedicated Intelligence Brach (different nomenclature in different states) and in some cases, Anti-Terrorist Cells. Unfortunately colour of the ideology and caste configuration decides the parameters of ‘intelligence operations’ by the State IB units. They are restrained from operating in certain areas of the ‘secular fence, ‘caste fence’ and ‘criminal niches.’ These limitations have impeded ‘police- intelligence operations’ in Assam, West Bengal, and Bihar, UP, Delhi, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Plenty of evidences are there to prove that political interferences continue to impede the operational edges of the State security tools. The forces are trained to operate irrespective of caste, religious, political and mafia affiliation of terrorists and jihadists. But they are forced to discriminate, refrain and restrain from operating according to the Law of The Land. Often the holy ghost of ‘secularism’ invade the state legislatures and even the Parliament for scrapping certain Acts of the country and for chaining the tools of governance, simply because Pappus want a few more votes (a la Madani case in Tamil Nadu-Kerala).
Whenever serious terror attacks occur and police/intelligence agencies start investigating ‘certain community leaders’ start shouting for being ‘isolated and targeted.’ They never assure the people that they would evolve a mechanism to protect their community from being contaminated by ‘foreign instigators’. Have they ever given calls from organised platforms to their community to refrain from collaborating with Pakistani and Bangladeshi conspirators? If not, what right do they have to complain? As good Indians, they should have gone into the community with the message for rebuffing Pakistani/Bangladeshi saboteurs.
When shall the nation ask these questions to vote-hungry politicos? When shall the compulsions of electoral democracy transcend the cubicles of polling booths, ‘secular fences’ and adopt holistic administrative, constitutional, legal and patriotic view against the jihadist thrust driven into Indian heartland from foreign soils?

4. India requires strengthening of the State Intelligence tools, revival of the ‘khabri’, ‘mohalla nighrani’ system, introduction of ‘community policing’ and providing better tools for augmenting human, technical, and electronic intelligence gathering systems. There is tremendous scope for integrating the State Intelligence tools with the Panchayat, Block Development, Gram Sevak/Sevika, Dakia, Chowkidar, Dafadar, Lambardar etc systems, wherever these still exist. It should be made mandatory for the ‘neighbourhood policing’ cells to report suspected matters to the nearest police station. These tools have gone into disuse and the State Governments have not carried out any threat assessment from criminal, jihadist, and mafia forces and have not equipped its police and intelligence tools to combat these threats.
Moreover, the State IB and police have no institutionalised and speedy communication system to liase with the Central Intelligence and Security agencies and the intelligence and security agenises of other states. It is imperative to discuss the important aspects of immigration control, detection and deportation of illegal immigrants and cracking down on criminal-politician-terrorist nexus. When shall the political breed agree to introduce ‘National Identity Cards’?
We fail, because our tools have been blunted and taken hostage by vote and money hunting political class.

5. We fail because the Central Intelligence Bureau, the cutting edge Internal Security tool of the Union Government is ill prepared to combat aggressive operations of the ISI, DGFI and Islamist tanzeems. The Bureau has well-trained, motivated and dedicated operators to gather intelligence and operate along areas of National Fault Lines. The IB operates through its Central Operations Units and Subsidiary Units in States. From North East to Gujarat, Kashmir to Kanyakumari it has a vast geographical area and extremely complex problems to grapple with. With Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan factors thrown in, IB finds even its noses drowned under the flood of events that threaten the nation. The IB is simply not equipped to handle the enormous canvas, which is getting complicated by the day.

6. It suffers from:
i. Lack of trained manpower at operative level;

ii, Inadequacy of modern training to combat acts of terrorism and insurgency;

iii. Lack of electronic and technical intelligence equipments for combating the vast and expanding fields of information and communication technology;

iv. Near inability to generate Human Assets in target areas where the indigenous and foreign jihadists establish nests, modules, cells and chains of secondary support system. The IB has not yet opted for certain ‘unorthodox’ tradecraft that can enable it to penetrate the target areas. It relies more on limited electronic and technical intelligence to cover trans-border movements, induction of arms, explosives and trained jihadists from Pakistan and Bangladesh;

v. The IB has very little support from sister agencies like the R&AW about location, preparation and planning of the jihadist tanzeems in Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries-the UK, USA, Indonesia, Thailand, Nepal and certain European destinations.

vi. Support system from other friendly countries are not threat and issue specific. India can urge the friendly nations to reorient their tools to cover the jihadist thrust in the subcontinent, as it has emerged as the neuronal epicentre of East-Fareast -West journey of jihadist impulses.

vii. The information and operations sharing mechanism between the Centre and the States is in rudimentary stage. It should be augmented under the auspices of the National Security Council. The Electronic, Technical and IamgeInt data collation and monitoring system at the Central and State levels require integration under the auspices of the NSC. The same facility should be able to integrate with the existing agencies that are engaged in handling suspected line, air and electronic cipher traffic and www menace.

viii. The Intelligence Bureau require immediate geographic, operational and resources expansion. The Union Government, as indicated by the Prime Minister should pay immediate attention to these burning needs. This exercise should be completed within next five years after speedy determination of National Intelligence Estimate (revised periodically). Otherwise, the IB will continue to lag behind the cancer of Jihadist thrust. The authorities should not forget that besides carrying out serial bombings the Jihadists under the protective umbrella of the ISI, DGFI and the Al Qaeda Inc are capable of importing and indigenous manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction. The CIA does not rule out the possibility of Al Qaeda Inc developing crude and dirty nuclear bombs.

ix. People have the right to know the threat quantum they face from inimical forces and should also be assured that the government, besides scanning the sensex graph and GNP, GDP arithmetic is duty bound to protect lives and properties of the citizen. People are threatened by a new kind of war, which is known to the people of the North East, Punjab and Kashmir. For the heartland and Peninsular India, it is a new experience. They have to live with it and compel their politicians to look beyond the ballot boxes and ‘secular fences.’ The State and Central governments must prove that they are capable of governing. They should be able to protect or prepare to perish.

x. The Intelligence Bureau is not equipped to monitor the Websites of the Islamist Jihadist groups. They do not have super fast computers, nationwide networking and surveillance capability on the servers of the ISP providers. Only prolonged studies and researches can decipher the coding pattern and transmission trademark of each terror group. These require regular logging and liasing with western agencies who have made forward strides, especially after 9/11 al Qaeda attack. Other nodal points in the government should embark upon the task of monitoring the virtual www world and share their inputs online with the Central and State intelligence agencies.

xi. The IB is also required to develop a focussed, dedicated and self-contained research and operations group to work at ground and desk levels to assess, anticipate, follow and pre-empt conspiracies and execution plans of the ISI, DGFI, Islamist tanzeems across the subcontinent. IB should be empowered to act and neutralise such enemies of the country, wherever possible, in concerted operations with the State agencies. The question of empowering the IB with limited ‘retaliatory forward operations’ capability should be seriously examined with a view to paying back the responsible tanzeems in their own coins.

xii. We fail because the IB is not allowed by the government to expose its wares to the larger audience of any Parliamentary Watchdog Body. The country is not entitled to know why they fail and why they cannot be made fail proof. The agency is out of bound for the RTI Act of 2005. It should at least be made accountable to the Parliament, so that people can know how their money is being spent and how the political masters manipulate the agencies. The people have a right to know. Failures cannot be covered up behind the veil of departmental security rules.

7. We fail because our coastal policing and intelligence gathering mechanism is appallingly poor. Besides the Coast Guard, which normally patrol the deeper shallow waters and the BSF, which covers certain eastern riverine borders with Bangladesh, the State governments do not take coastal policing seriously. The Existing police forces are not adequate, trained and equipped to police the vast western coastal area from Kot Lakhpat to Wapi in Gujarat and Daman on Maharashtra to Bhatkal in Karnataka and beyond in Kerala. Besides, over a dozen major ports, the western coast has nearly 150 minor ports, over 200 landing sites and over 500 shallow landing creeks. Police and Customs presence in the major ports aside, there is skeletal or no Customs or Police presence in minor ports and nothing at all in the landing sites and shallow creeks. Police departments have a few slow moving dhows and negligible fast boats without GPS technology. Pakistan and other Jihadist forces can land any amount of arms and explosives through the vast unmanned western coastal area. India has no blueprint to tackle this menace. A nation under attack still thinks ‘people’s resilience’ is the only weapon to fight the jihadist forces. When shall we wake up to the needs for a special coastal policing and intelligence system?

8. We fail because our disaster management mechanism is appallingly neglected. There exists a high sounding body in Delhi, fat at the top minus vital limbs. The State governments are not concerned to manage disasters beyond paying ex-gratia grants to the dead and injured. The Central Disaster Management outfit should be integrated with the State outfits and a unified command structure is required to be in position with adequate resources. Response time should be minimised to ten minutes at proximate locations and not more than twenty minutes at difficult locations.

9. We fail because Pakistan, Bangladesh and other Islamist forces are very fast salvaging the ‘communal debris’ left by the scars of partition. Politicians are aiding these forces by mimicking the British ‘divide and rule’ policy. They are fuelling the ruffled sentiments that arise out of poverty, lack of education and opportunities. Our system has failed to address these crying needs. The political class has failed to bridge the gaps left by partition. They have widened the gaps through vote catching slogans and doing precious little for them. The poors among the Muslims are as poor as the poors in any other community. They live, because they happen to be born. Nothing beyond!

10. We fail because we suspect each other. We fail because even the Hindus are fragmented. We fail because we do not behave as a united people. Our unity, our ability to rebuff the dubious politicians and our resolve to rise above the ghost of history can act as sure deterrence against the war imposed on us. This is not a war by Muslims against Hindus. It is a war against India by the foreign-based Jihadist forces headed by Pakistan, Bangladesh and International Islamist Inc. Every Indian is required to unitedly fight these enemies. The foreign forces should not succeed in subverting our own people by taking advantage of lapses committed by the political caricatures. We must remember that Indian Muslims did not fight in Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s Kashmir jihad. They are one of us and we shall triumph together.